| 主页 | 频道首页 | 本站地图 | 论坛留言 | 合作联系 | 本站消息 | |
古代文化 文化动态 考古发现 历史研究 历史人物 外国文化 民俗文化 成语故事 国学经典 文化其他

王侯将相宁有种乎

2015-01-06
王侯将相宁有种乎,历史研究,名门望族
【学术版】王侯将相宁有种乎
作者: 水木新风

背景:

参考信息12月22日《研究显示中国解放前名门望族至今未衰》

格雷戈里·克拉克(Gregory Clark)和尼尔·卡明斯(Neil Cummins)两位学者今年早些时候出版了新书《儿辈也崛起:姓氏,以及社会流动的历史》(The Son Also Rises: Surnames and the History of Social Mobility)。他们研究了8个国家几世纪来精英阶层的家族传承,并发现所有国家精英阶层的传承性都和现代英国相似。

其中,有95%的把握确定中国的社会地位代际传承系数在0.71-0.92之间。也就是说,1949年精英阶层的直系后代在2006年跻身精英阶层的可能性在71%到92%之间。这与资本主义时期的英国和样本中其他国家都非常相近。

而克拉克和卡明斯指出,经过20世纪40年代末、50年代初的土地改革,中国地主阶层的土地已为国家所有并进行了再分配;在这一过程中,数十万名地主被镇压。随后的60年代和70年代,大量曾是地主、商人和资产阶级身份的人士及其亲属在文化大革命中受迫害。大批城市青年被派往乡村,没有受教育的机会。这一切都是为了推动社会平等化。

两位学者发问道,毛泽东是否真的通过消灭、压制和抢夺造就了社会流动性极高的一个时代?出人意料的是,答案是否定的。两位学者从元、明、清科举考试中举名单里的5万余人中选定了出现率极高的13个姓氏。这些姓氏在中国近现代名人榜中——包括北洋政府和国民党政府时代的高官、中国最有名的10所大学的教授、2006年资产超过150万美元的上市公司董事和现在的政府官员——出现的频率也非常高。这些姓氏的人物在国民党当政时期和2006年时在教授、集团董事和高官中的社会地位代际传承系数分别是0.9、0.8和0.74。其他姓氏的人社会地位忽上忽下,但这些名门望族却从未衰落。




小编说:

精英与否,与精英是否限制了其他人成为精英的可能是两个问题。暂且不论中国1956-1978这段历史中的“左”,单从1949和2006的时间节点来看,精英阶层没有变化,“与资本主义时期的英国和样本中其他国家都非常相近”。

怎么看这个结果呢?或许可从中信集团创始人荣毅仁(1916年-2005年)的遭遇得到些答案。1949年,国民党买办资本集团不带民族资本家玩儿了,“荣家产业损耗大半,更在仓皇北顾中一分为三,凝聚不再”。

1953-1956年的社会主义三大改造,“荣氏门下纺织厂竞相宣布参与公私合营”,可以说宣告以资本论精英的终结,私有财富这一阶层流动的障碍被移除。

“1979年1月,邓小平公开倡导:工商界的人要用起来,工商界的钱也要用起来。”“在邓小平亲自允诺的‘全权’负责的前提下,昔日荣少爷的实业热情在白发苍苍的年龄被最大程度地激发。国家一时难以巨额投资,荣自掏腰包1000万,先期启动。”

就这样,官、商精英在中国完成了精英阶层家族传承的英国模式。







附参考文章

Here’s the surprising social trait that the English and Chinese have in common

Written by

Manuel Hinds

December 18, 2014

Not just capitalism.(AP Photo/Andy Wong)

SHARE

Written by

Manuel Hinds

December 18, 2014

It’s the social mobility of their respective elite classes. What does this mean? Well, two professors, Gregory Clark and Neil Cummins, have recently published a very interesting paper called “Surnames and Social Mobility in England, 1170-2012.” Bear with me while I explain their research, before I turn to the surprising correlation and explanation of why China has had a similar outcome as England.

Clark and Cummins take a long-term view of staying power of the elites, estimating the correlation between the status of families through multiple generations—that is, how much of the current elite status of a person can be explained by the status of his parent, and the parent of his parent, and so on. As a proxy for the families, they take distinguished surnames that are not common and are overrepresented among the elites. One name is overrepresented when it appears more frequently in the elites than what you could expect given the number of people who use it. They define elite in various ways: in England, they use the attendance to Oxford and Cambridge since 1170.

Using educational status in England throughout this period they show that “Oxbridge attendance suggests a generalized intergenerational correlation in status in the range of 0.70-0.90. Social status is more strongly inherited even than height. This correlation is unchanged over centuries. Social mobility in England in 2012 was little greater than in preindustrial times. Thus there are indications of an underlying social physics surprisingly immune to government intervention.”

It is highly tempting to blame this on capitalism, andsome people have insinuated this already.

Blaming this persistence of the same families in the elite on capitalism would be jumping to conclusions too rashly. For that, we should have a comparator country in a period in which it has not been capitalist. It happens to exist, and the two authors of the recently published paper (along with several other co-authors), have documented it. In fact, the paper mentioned above summarizes two chapters of a book they published earlier this year,The Son Also Rises: Surnames and the History of Social Mobility, Princeton University Press, 2014, available in Kindle. They studied the elite’s surnames’ behavior for eight countries and several centuries and found that in all of them the persistence of the elites was similar to modern England (which was similar to that of medieval England.)

In addition to England, the studied countries were Sweden (supposedly a social democratic country with high social mobility), the United States (land of opportunity), India (admittedly rigid but ruled by socialists for several decades), Taiwan, Japan, Korea and Chile. To crown the list, they studied China under communism and compared it with previous stages of the almost interminable history of the country.

And, surprise, surprise, the social mobility of communist China, including the Mao years, and the previous nationalist years, is very similar to that of England (and to all the other countries in the list.) Maybe you are thinking that, yes, of course, there was an elite in communist China, there is one everywhere—but surely they would be different names and people from those that formed the pre-communist elite. After all, as Clark and Cummins note, a million mainland Chinese fled to Taiwan when the communists defeated the opposing Nationalists—most of them members of the elite. Under the communist agrarian reform in the late 1940s and early 1950s the land owned by the landlord class was seized and redistributed—amounting to 43% of all the land in China; in the process, 800,000 landlords were executed. Then, in the 1960s and 1970s, about 10 million of the relatives of former landlords, businessmen, and apparent bourgeois were killed during the Cultural Revolution. All in all, the communists killed about 60 million people on the excuse that they were bourgeois. This included teachers, intellectuals, professionals and anybody that sniffed at being a member of the previous elites. Large numbers of students in the urban regions were sent to the countryside and denied education—to facilitate the equalization of society.

The authors ask whether Mao created a period of unusually rapid social mobility through the elimination, repression, and dispossession of the upper and middle classes?

Surprisingly, he did not. The authors identified 13 surnames that appear with unusual frequency in the Qin examination system—the Chinese test to identify who will become a member of the highest elite in the country, the state bureaucracy. They selected them from more than 50,000 successful candidates (the most successful) in the Yuan, Ming, and Qin dynasties, starting in 221 BCE (we are talking China). These surnames are overrepresented in the modern imperial era and in modern Chinese elites—the high officials in the Nationalist government from 1912 to the triumph of the communists in 1949; professors at the ten most prestigious universities in the country in 2012; chairs of the boards of companies listed in 2006 as having assets of .5 million and above; and members of the (still communist) central government administration in 2010.

The intergenerational correlation of status between the Nationalist period (just before the Communists escalated power) and 2006 (that is, covering almost thirty years of Maoism and then the current variety of communism) was 0.9 for professors in 2006, 0.8 for company board chairs and 0.74 for central government officials. This means that if you predict that the surname of a member of the elite in 1912-1949 would still be a member of the central government elite in 2006, you would be right in 74% of the cases in each generation. Other names come and go, but these ones stay. That is staying power. And it happened under a communist regime that killed scores of millions of people suspected of being members of the elite.

Clark and Cummins made other estimations using different data sets. They came to the conclusion that we can be 95% confident that the true intergenerational correlation of status for Communist China lies in the range of 0.71-0.92. If you were a member of the elite in 1949, your immediate descendants had a probability of being members of the elite themselves of 71 to 92%. This is very close to capitalist England—and to all the other countries in the sample.

These results contradict many studies that estimate much lower intergenerational correlations. These, however, are based on the comparison between two generations only. Clark and Cummins’ results are more reliable because they cover many generations, and everybody knows that the higher the number of observations, the better the estimate because it tends to eliminate chance events.

The authors say that their results do not imply that some individual families do not decay or that others fail to escalate the heights of society. They estimate that any elite family in any of these countries will go up and then down, following a process called regression to the mean. The process, however, could take from 600 to 800 years, even in communist countries. Take that, Marx!

We welcome your comments atideas@qz.com.


当今中国史学界的困境
中西方历史的十大惊人巧合
俄罗斯历史重大揭秘:共济会难道真的控制了苏共高层
日本是如何走向灭亡
中国近代史: 蒋廷黻
简单概括第二次世界大战的金融原因
吕正惠:就台湾“学运”对大陆青年人说几句心里话
国家治理逻辑与中国官僚体制:一个韦伯理论视角
中国发展模式及其理论体系构建
为什么中国媒体总抱怨体制
普京的底气哪里来
基辛格:怎样化解乌克兰危机
梁文道:一个普通人离杀人有多远
何新:日美看透中国,不给中国调整和改变的时间
让人啼笑皆非的鸦片战争
“同志加兄弟”越南时刻准备着与中国“再战”
阿来:中国人易忘历史 每个王朝覆灭原因都一样
隋朝为什么会突然土崩瓦解,有什么历史必然性
成吉思汗蒙古帝国的后人今何在
一寸山河一寸血:淞沪会战始末
当前时代和一战前惊人相似
解读中国国家起源的新模式
中国反恐要吸取美国的教训
冲突解决的诸种机制
端宏斌:为什么政府高层热读《旧制度与大革命》
苏联为何输掉冷战?美国是如何赢得冷战的
日本真有那么优秀吗
大清如何变成中国
历史对钓鱼岛对峙的警示
读史的三个境界
《公民社会不可能通过革命来达到》
中国将会成为怎样的超级大国
孙培松:中国应帮助日本自立
中国王朝灭亡的历史统计
1937年南京青龙山军队消失之谜
为什么国家会失败
一段比较靠谱的明朝遗民反思
英国高校青睐中国研究
张树华:俄罗斯经济私有化教训与启示
未来世界的复杂性
<万历十五年的路径困惑>评论
万历十五年的路径困惑
掠夺性社会精英的问题
解体前共济会早已控制苏共高层
隐身人:共济会其实就一个字
中国现代化的国际环境与外交战略
历史研究1历史研究2

本栏目主要介绍历史文化,历史研究方面,包括最新的中国历史文化,中国历史,历史故事,历史小说,中国历史朝代,王侯将相宁有种乎等。特别关注有关人与文化的价值方面的研究。

古代文化,传统文化,历史文化频道首页 考古发现页首